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INTRODUCTION
As private sector labor union membership in the United States
dwindles, the number of worker centers continues to grow. In 1985, there
were just five worker centers in the United States.' Today there are more
than 200 such centers.2 Worker centers are often broadly defined as
t Associate Professor of Labor & Employment Law, ILR School, Cornell University. An
earlier version of this piece was presented at the NYU Center for Labor & Employment Law on
November 6, 2014. I appreciate the comments from the audience and commentators, Tosh Anderson,
Professor Samuel Estreicher, Aaron Halegua, Dennis Lalli, and Patricia McConnell. This essay
benefitted from insightful conmments and observations by Eli Naduris-Weissman and from exemplary
research assistance by Joseph Bazler and Haylee Bernstein. I take sole responsibility for all errors or
omissions.
1. JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM
10(2006).
2. Janice Fine, How Innovative Worker Centers Help America's Most Vulnerable Wage Earners,
SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETwoRK 1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/
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"community-based mediating institutions that organize, advocate, and
provide direct support to low-wage workers."3 Given worker centers' focus
on low-wage workers largely engaged in service sectors of our post-
industrial economy and their relatively recent entrance into the field of
United States labor relations,4 scholars and commentators are increasingly
debating the applicability of the eighty-year-old National Labor Relations
Act5 (NLRA) to the worker organizing activities of these emerging
organizations.
As Part I will elaborate upon, until now, those who have examined the
applicability of the NLRA to worker centers have focused on whether the
NLRA's restrictions on "labor organizations" apply to worker centers.6
These analyses inform our understanding of how the eighty-year-old NLRA
maps onto contemporary worker center activity, but they overlook a central
feature of the NLRA--the NLRA's section 7 protections of collective
activity among "employees."
Part II considers the extent to which NLRA protections have been
helpful to worker center organizing efforts to date. The law on the books
indisputably supports the idea that the NLRA regime could protect
employees from some forms of employer retaliation in response to their
worker center organizing activity.7 The NLRA's section 7 protections,
which were at the heart of the NLRA as originally enacted in 1935, restrict
employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees who
files/ssn key findings fine on the benefits of worker centers.pdf.
3. Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United
States, 66 INDUS. REL. 604, 605-06 (2011), see also Josh Eidelson, Who Should FundAlt-Labor?, THE
NATION (July 17, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175313/who-should-fund-alt-labor#
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEW MODEL OF REPRESENTATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING
WORKER CENTERS 1-2 (2014) (distinguishing between worker centers that are "conmiunity-based
organizations" and worker centers that have become the "new face of traditional labor unions").
4. The paper considers the contemporary period. Some argue that worker centers look similar to
organizations that existed before the New Deal period. See, e.g., David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:
Emerging Labor Organizations-Until They Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 472-74 (2006).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Michael C. Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor
Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 853-60 (2014), Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker
Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
232, 334-35 (2009), Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 472-74 Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker
Representation in the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2006).
7. Indeed, existing law contains significant protections for non-union workers. See, e.g., Kati L.
Griffith, The NLRA Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or Diamond in the Rough?, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2009) (describing how the NLRA can be used by worker centers to require a heightened
standard of proof in defamation cases brought by employers during a "labor dispute"), Cynthia L.
Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 118-19 (1995) ("The NLRA
is rarely used by and is largely unfamiliar to nonunion employees outside the organizing context. But
[NLRA] section 7 is a potentially significant source of free speech rights in the workplace on issues of
concern to workers, it protects speech about unionization or other forms of employee representation,
discussion of work-related grievances, and petitioning for their redress.").
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engage in protected concerted activity, regardless of whether they are
members of a union, involved in a worker center's organizing campaign, or
acting independently of any organization.'
Nonetheless, as Part II will illustrate, the NLRA's section 7 protections
for collective activity have not been very meaningful to worker centers in
practice. This observation is perplexing in light of the breadth of NLRA
section 7 protection and the fact that the few worker centers that have
sought NLRA protection for their members were successful in their efforts.
Part III proposes several theories to explain why worker centers have
not turned to the NLRA's protections more proactively. In conclusion, the
essay proposes a framework for future empirical work in this area. Given
the focus on the applicability of labor law legal strategies, the essay centers
its analysis on the subset of worker centers that organize workers in an
attempt to improve their wages and working conditions and sometimes
employ legal strategies in conjunction with their organizing activity. 9
I. WORKER CENTERS AND NLRA RESTRICTIONS
As mentioned in the introduction, to date, those who have examined
the applicability of the federal labor law to worker centers have focused on
whether worker centers fall within the NLRA's definition of a "labor
organization." This question is, of course, relevant to any discussion of the
NLRA and worker centers because labor organization status would subject
worker centers to the restrictive aspects of the NLRA.
For instance, if a worker center is an NLRA "labor organization," the
NLRA's section 8(b) provisions, which emerged as part of the NLRA's
Taft-Hartley amendments in 1946, could restrict the kinds of secondary
boycott activity that some worker centers commonly engage in during
campaigns. 10 Moreover, in some circumstances, labor organization status
could lead to NLRA charges against worker centers under NLRA section
8(b)(1) for allegedly restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights to engage or disengage in collective activities with
their fellow employees.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, the U.S. Supreme Court
confirmed the NLRA's coverage of collective action among employees who were not engaged in union
organizing. 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962).
9. Worker centers are highly diverse. Some centers, for instance, organize workers by industry
while others organize by community or geographic area. See generally FINE, supra note 1 see, e.g.,
NEW ORLEANS WORKERS' CENTER FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, http://nowcj.org/about-2/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) ("In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, African American workers were locked out of the
reconstruction, while immigrant workers were locked in), U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 3,
Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, FINE, supra note 1.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2012).
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Labor organization status under the definition contained in the NLRA's
Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959 would place significant restraints on
worker centers by mandating certain organizational structures, election
procedures, membership privileges, and more burdensome reporting
requirements to the federal government."
The labor organization debate does tell us something about the
NLRA's relevance to worker centers. It highlights a mismatch between the
aspects of the NLRA that promote and regulate collective bargaining and
the current state of worker center activity. Because worker centers often do
not explicitly intend to help workers enter into ongoing contractual
agreements with their employers, aspects of the NLRA that relate to "labor
organizations" and assume a collective bargaining model often do not fit.12
Only when worker centers start engaging in a "bilateral mechanism" which
enables employees and a particular employer to go back and forth on issues
relating to employees' wages and working conditions, would the NLRA's
labor organization restrictions become applicable. 3
Instead of seeking ongoing contractual relationships with employers,
worker centers that organize workers and pursue legal strategies often seek
change through high-publicity lawsuits and campaigns to enforce and/or
raise minimum labor standards. Many of these worker centers target
particular employers that they believe are the worst offenders with respect
i. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2012) ("Every member of a labor organization shall have
equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections... to
attend membership meetings and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such
meetings .... ). Currently, there is significant variation in what it means to be a "member" of a worker
center and rarely does it mean that a member has a right to run for office to become a leader of the
organization. Workers at some day labor centers, for example, are expected to be present for a certain
amount of time each day and to complete certain tasks to keep their placement in the order of
employment allocation. See generally Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, at 241-55, see also Fine, New
Forms to Settle Old Scores, supra note 3, at 606-07, 609-10, Janice Fine, A Marriage Made in Heaven2
Mismatches and Misunderstandings between Worker Centres and Unions, 45 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 335,
338, 342 (2007).
12. The Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), for instance, states that it
"seeks improved working conditions for restaurant workers citywide ... assists restaurant workers
seeking legal redress against employers who violate their employment rights ... [and] does not seek to
represent the workers or be recognized as a collective bargaining agent of the workers at this restaurant."
DIGNITY AT DARDEN, http://www.dignityatdarden.org/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). Day-labor worker
centers complicate this story somewhat, as they do often act as quasi-intermediaries between employers
and day laborers. But while day-labor worker centers may make significant "minimum" demands of
employers (minimum wages, minimum number of hours hired), the "contracts" are informal and most
aspects are settled without the intrusion of the center. See generally Nik Theodore, Abel Valenzuela, Jr.,
& Edwin Melendez, Worker Centers: Defending Labor Standards for Migrant Workers in the Informal
Economy, 30 INT'L J. MANPOWER 422 (2009).
13. The labor organization debate has centered on the issue of whether the worker center "exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers" regarding wages and working
conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992),
enforced sub nom. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994), Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 701-02 (2001).
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to flouting basic labor protections, such as minimum wage and overtime
requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")4 and its state
equivalents, health and safety laws, and protections against employment
discrimination. 5 Worker centers sometimes gain significant publicity for
these cases, which they hope will serve as a deterrent for other employers
and will help to educate government officials about much-needed
improvements in labor standards and protections. 6
Thus, unlike the traditional collective bargaining model of labor unions
in the United States, worker centers do not principally intend to establish
contractual agreements in particular workplaces as the way to bring
employees' wages, benefits, and working conditions above the minimum
standards required by law.' 7 Currently, worker centers largely do not
actively seek to be part of the long-term, day-to-day relationship between
employers and employees in particular workplaces. While informative, the
"labor organization" debate overlooks the applicability of the NLRA's
section 7 protection of collective activity among employees regardless of
their involvement with a "labor organization."
II. WORKER CENTERS AND NLRA PROTECTIONS
Because the NLRA broadly permits any "person" to file an unfair labor
practice charge, worker centers could assist their constituents in filing a
charge or file one on their behalf. Nonetheless, while there are a few
exceptions, worker centers that organize workers and sometimes pursue
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 etseq. (2012).
15. See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, at 240 ("In part, worker centers are a response to the
increasing nunbers of vulnerable immigrants working in industries that are abusive or fail to meet
minimum employment standards set by law."). See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as
Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2685, 2744 (2008) (arguing that FLSA and Title VII have the potential
to faciitate collective worker action, especially compared with the NLRA), Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor
Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 375 (2007) (claiming that he NLRA was designed to
override other federal- and state-level labor statutes, but that the current regime is dysfunctional because
it fails to protect workers' right to organize).
16. See, e.g., Adam B. Ellick, Boulud Settling Suit Alleging Bias at a French Restaurant, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2007, at B3, available at htp://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31 /nyregion/3 Idaniel.html.
17. See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, at 238 (stating that worker centers do not intend to
become the majority bargaining representative of employees in order to negotiate with employers),
Richard B. Freeman, What Can Labor Organizations Do for US. Workers When Unions Can't Do What
Unions Used to Do?, in What Works for Workers?: Public Policies and Innovative Strategies for Low-
Wage Workers 50, 64 (Stephanie Luce et al. eds., 2014) (same). Labor unions are experimenting with
other models as well. See, e.g., Steve Early, Op-Ed., What North American Unions Can Learn From
Labor Organizations Abroad, teleSUR (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opiion/What-
North-American-Uions-Can-Leam-From-Labor-Organizers-Abroad-20141006-0003.htnil (reporting
that AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka has stated that he "system of workplace representation is
failing to meet the needs of America's workers" and has recommended "new models for organizing
workers" such as minority unions and other models besides collective bargaining on behalf of the
majority of employees).
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legal strategies generally have not utilized the NLRA as part of their efforts
to protect workers that they believe were retaliated against based on their
organizing activity. A search of Lexis Legal and the NLRB's online
database has identified only seven worker centers that have assisted workers
in the filing of twelve different NLRB charges.' 8 The author searched both
sources using the names of the 137 worker centers listed in Janice Fine's
seminal treatise on worker centers.'9 All of these complaints alleged
employer retaliation in response to concerted activity among employees
who had been involved in worker center organizing efforts. 20
Admittedly, this search strategy is likely to have undercounted the total
number of worker centers that have turned to the NLRB and the total
number of NLRB cases that have emerged from worker center organizing
efforts. 2' Some worker centers have emerged after Fine's study and would
18. See NLRB, hitp://www.nlrb.gov/search/all (use "Search" tool).
19. See FINE, supra note 1, at 271-82..
20. Chinese Staff and Workers Association has assisted in the preparation of at least five NLRA
charges that were the basis of complaints issued by the General Counsel. See E. Vill. Grand Sichuan
(Grand Sichuan), Case 02-CA-086946, 2013 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *1 (Nov. 6, 2013), adopted by
Grand Sichuan, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 161 (Feb. 27, 2014) (cease and desist order), 47 Old Country, Inc.
(Babi 1), Case 29-CA-030247, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 26, 2012), Always is Nails,
Case Nos. 29-CA-28950, 29-CA-29109, 29-CA-29201, 29-CA-29232, JD(NY)-28-10, 2010 NLRB
LEXIS 193, at *1 (July 26, 2010), The Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc. (Majestic Rest. & Buffet), Case 22-
CA-27468, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 277, at *1-2 (Sept. 4, 2009), U Ocean Palace Pavilion, Inc., 345
N.L.R.B. 1162, 1164 (2005). The Comite de Trabajadores de Santa Fe Tortilla, which emerged from a
specific organizing effort, filed an NLRA charge on behalf of a group of workers at a tortilla-making
facility. See SFTC, LLC (Santa Fe Tortilla Co.), Case 28-CA-087842 & 28-CA-095332, 360 N.L.R.B.
No. 130, slip op. at 1-2 (June 13, 2014). The Heartland Worker Center filed an NLRA charge alleging
that employer retahated against meat processing workers because they protested the increased speed of
the conveyer belt, among other things. See Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc., Cases 17-CA-085735, 17-
CA-085736, & 17-CA-085737, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 1 (Mar. 12, 2014). Korean Immgrant
Workers Advocates (KIWA) filed an NLRA charge on behalf of employees of a Korean Language
newspaper. See Dong-A Daily N. Am., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 15, 15 (2000), enforced, 337 N.L.R.B. No.
111 (June 27, 2002) (enforcing the backpay due to the petitioner). Restaurant Opportunities Center
(ROC) helped employees gain counsel to file NLRA charges against a restaurant employer. See
Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., Cases 2-CA-38990, 2-CA-39002, 2-CA-39012, 2-CA-39017, & 2-CA-39157,
356 N.L.R.B. No. 129, slip op. at 10 (Mar. 31, 2011). Voces de la Frontera filed an NLRA petition on
behalf of furniture assemblers. See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 649, 649 (2008),
invalidated due to lack ofquorum by New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010). Voces de
la Frontera also filed an NLRA petition on behalf of other workers in Esperanza Unida, Inc., Case 30-
CA-18996, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 768, at *1 (Dec. 30, 2011). The Western North Carolina Worker Center
filed an NLRA charge against a poultry processing employer. See Case Farms of N.C., Inc., S. 11-CA-
21378, 2007 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *1 (Sept. 28, 2007), Case Farms of N.C., Inc., Cases 11-CA-21378
and 11-CA-21379, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 26, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 30, 2008), invalidated due to lack of
quorum by New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 6 74 (2010), see also Kawa Sushi Rest., Case 02-
CA-039736, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op. at 1 (Feb. 28, 2013) (union filed complaint but underlying
facts also involved the worker center's activities), Century Rest. & Buffet, Inc., Case 22-CA-029242,
358 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 1 (Mar. 27, 2012) (same).
21. For instance, existing literature makes reference to cases that I did not find through
electronically-available sources. See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6 at 253 n.80 ("ROC has also
successfully made claims with the NLRB, despite the lengthy and imperfect process, when workers were
retaliated against for organizing activity."), FINE, supra note 1, at 160 (contending that some worker
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not be incorporated.22 Charges that were initially dismissed, withdrawn, or
settled are not publically available through these sources. This is
significant-ninety-seven percent of unfair labor practice charges are
resolved through dismissals for lack of merit, withdrawals or settlements
between the parties.23
Moreover, charges where the worker center was not the charging party,
or was not otherwise mentioned in the description of the facts, would not
have surfaced. The available information solely relates to cases that
resulted in either a General Counsel Memorandum or a decision by an
Administrative Law Judge or the Board itself. Despite these limitations,
however, the available information paints a picture that is widely confirmed
by other accounts of worker center activity: the NLRB has been largely
irrelevant to worker center strategies. 24
Despite this seeming irrelevance, when worker centers have turned to
the Board and the cases have resulted in reported decisions (rather than
settlements, dismissals or withdrawals), the employees involved have
largely prevailed. In eleven out of the twelve cases, the NLRB concluded
that the employer unlawfully retaliated against employees who were
organizing in conjunction with a worker center.25 In the other reported
case, the parties settled and the NLRB issued a cease and desist order,
notice posting, and other remedies. 26 The Board has treated these cases like
all of its other cases alleging employer retaliation, making no note of the
centers make use of the NLRA framework but that it "has become significantly less effective in
protecting the ight to organize").
22. See, e.g., Gates & Sons Barbeque of Mo., Inc., 14-CA-110229, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 713, at *4
(June 17, 2014) (concluding, in a case initiated by a worker center unfair labor practice charge, that a
restaurant employer violated NLRA section 8(a)(1) by removing employees' meal benefit due to their
participation in a fast-food strike).
23. See Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges in FY13, NAT'L LAB. REL. BD.,
http://www. nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/charges-and-complaints/disposition-unfair-labor-
practice-charges (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
24. See Naduis-Weissman, supra note 6, at 238 (stating that worker centers "have for the most
part shied away from using NLRB processes to protect worker ights"), Freeman, supra note 17, at 64
(noting that worker centers do not turn to the NLRA/NLRB because it is "dysfunctional"), see also
JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 89-90 (2005), FINE,
supra note 1, at 160.
25. See Grand Sichuan, 2013 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *32-33; Santa Fe Tortilla Co., 360 N.L.R.B.
No. 130, slip op. at 4, Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 11, Babi I,
358 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7, Fiskardo Estiatorio Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 129, slip op. at 40-41,
Always is Nails, 2010 NLRB LEXIS 193, at *16-17; Majestic Rest. & Buffet, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 277,
at *264-66 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 2008 NLRB LEXIS 307, at *12-13; Case Farms of N.
Carolina, Inc., 2007 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *22-23 U Ocean Palace Pavilion, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. at
1175, Dong-A Daily N. Am., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. at 17. In each case, it was found that the employer
violated the NLRA.
26. See Esperanza Unida, Inc., Case 30-CA-18996, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 768, at *1 (Dec. 30,
2011) (settlement and order).
2015
338 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 36:2
fact that the protected concerted activity was instigated by a "worker
center," rather than a labor organization.
Yet, even though employees involved in worker center organizing have
generally fared well at the NLRB, turning to the NLRB is overwhelmingly
the exception, not the rule. Why don't worker centers turn to the NLRB
more often? In the following subparts, this essay advances a number of
reasons why worker centers, even those that organize workers and
sometimes pursue legal strategies to support the workers that they organize,
may not be utilizing the NLRA proactively to support their organizing
efforts.
A. Constituencies
Worker centers often serve constituencies that (i) they believe have
access to more expedient 27 and robust, legal alternatives than federal labor
law when their participants experience employer retaliation in response to
collective activity; and either (ii) do not have NLRA rights or (iii) have
NLRA rights, but do not have access to NLRA remedies when those rights
are violated.
1. Low-wage Workers Who Experience Employment Law Violations
Worker centers that facilitate legal cases on behalf of their constituents
may prefer taking advantage of the anti-retaliation protections of other
statutes, rather than the NLRA's retaliation protections. Because worker
centers often organize low-wage workers who have relatively unstable, or
"precarious," 28 working conditions due to factors such as high turnover
rates and workplace rights violations, they often bring claims under non-
NLRA statutes, such as the FLSA 29 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
("Title VII")." Both statutes and their state corollaries include provisions
that protect workers from employer retaliation due to their participation in
complaints or lawsuits.
27. Delays have served as formidable obstacles for cases as they move through the NLRB
process. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T. Bodie, Review Essay-Administrative Delay at the
NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES. 87, 88-92 (2002).
28. See generally NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014) (describing the lack of employment security
and poor working conditions that low-wage workers often encounter), DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT
(2014) (explaining that recent business strategies have resulted in stagnating wages, benefits, and a
standard of living for workers), GuY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011)
(illustrating the circumstances of the precariat, a working class with a lack of stability).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012). Indeed, Professor Benjamin Sachs has elaborated the
ways that both the FLSA and Title VII often have more robust and efficient protections against
retaliation as compared to the NLRA. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 15, at 2694
(referring to the NLRA's "deeply inadequate remedial regime").
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Unlike the NLRA, both statutes allow employees to bring private rights
of action against employers in federal court. In the FLSA context, a
plaintiff can bring a case directly to court without interacting with any
federal agency.3' Similarly, in the Title VII context a plaintiff can pursue a
federal court case after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
issues a right to sue letter.3 2  Conversely, under the NLRA, the NLRB
General Counsel, not the employee, is the plaintiff in the case.33 The lack
of a private right of action can sometimes cause delay, as well as other
strategic problems for worker centers, stemming from the loss of control
over the legal process.
Title VII and FLSA also arguably have comparative advantages over
the NLRA when it comes to remedies for retaliation.34 The NLRA's
reinstatement and backpay (payment for the salary the employee would
have received if he or she had not been illegally fired in response to
protected concerted activity) remedies are compensatory remedies35 that
pale in comparison to FLSA's awards of liquidated damages (and punitive
damages in some circuits)36 and Title VII's compensatory and punitive
damages in intentional discrimination cases. 37
While access to private rights of action and more robust remedies
under FLSA or Title VII may dissuade some worker centers from turning to
the NLRA/NLRB for relief, some worker centers appear to view NLRA
remedies as beneficial enough to continue to pursue that strategy. 38 For
instance, in Babi I, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2012), the Chinese Staff and
Workers' Association ("Chinese Staff'), a worker center in New York City,
filed NLRA charges on behalf of nail lacquerers who alleged that their nail
salon employer retaliated against them because they jointly filed a FLSA
lawsuit against their employer. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the
employer violated NLRA section 8(a)(1) by issuing disciplinary warnings,
31. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012). If the General Counsel pursues the unfair labor practice charge,
the charging party can participate in the process to some extent.
34. Injunctions are also easier to attain under these statutes. See Sachs, Employment Law as
Labor Law, supra note 15, at 2707 (recounting a FLSA case and stating that "[t]he speed of the
injunction-which comes nine days after the discharge and thus nearly two years faster than an NLRB
order might have issued-constitutes a significant and potentially dispositive improvement over the
NLRA.").
35. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). Compare Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d
108, 112 (7th Cir. 1990) (punitive damages are available in FLSA retaliation cases), with Snapp v.
Unltd. Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 933-39 (Ilth Cir. 2000) (punitive damages are unavailable).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2012). Damages caps vary based on the number of people an
employer employs. An employee of a small employer can receive up to $50,000, while an employee of
an employer with more than 500 employees can receive up to $300,000. Id.
38. See, e.g., Always is Nails, 2010 WL 3285352, at *32-33 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges July 26,
2010) (holding that employer violated the NLRA).
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threatening to close the business, discharging employees, and keeping the
employees' concerted activities under surveillance. 9 Through an NLRB-
supervised settlement, the employer reinstated three of the four terminated
workers before the resolution of the FLSA case. 0 When the employer did
not reinstate the fourth worker, as required in the NLRB settlement
agreement, the NLRB entered a default judgment and ruled in favor of all
the employees' NLRA section 8(a)(1) claims."' In this case the NLRB
proved to be an effective mechanism for the workers.
Moreover, the NLRB process may have enhanced relevance when
FLSA and Title VII retaliation protections do not apply to the factual
circumstances of the case. For instance, the NLRB process could be
relevant in worker center cases involving an employer's allegedly
retaliatory act in response to collective activity that does not relate to the
FLSA or Title VII lawsuit or government complaint. The NLRA's section
7 retaliation protections related to organizing "for mutual aid or protection"
is much broader than collective activity related to a specific wage lawsuit.
In Grand Sichuan, for example, Chinese Staff filed an NLRA section
8(a)(1) charge against a restaurant employer. The Board concluded that the
employer's termination and reprimand of employees were in response to
employee discussions of their wages and potential legal claims and actions
related to minimum wage law. 2 In this context, FLSA's anti-retaliation
provisions may not have been accessible because the employees had not
made an actual complaint before the time of retaliation. 3 The NLRA's
protection of concerted activity covers a significantly broader set of
circumstances than FLSA and Title VII's retaliation protections.
Furthermore, in some cases, the NLRB's jurisdictional requirements
and prosecutorial power can serve as a benefit as compared to FLSA and
Title VII. Unlike FLSA, for instance, the NLRB can bring cases against
non-retail employers that do less than $500,000 annual gross volume of
business. Similarly, unlike Title VII, the NLRB is not limited to
39. Babi I, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 148, at 3 (Sept. 26, 2012).
40. See Sarah Maslin Nit, Saying Court Win Helps, Nail Salon Workers Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/nyregion/new-york-nail-salon-
workers-uniting-against-job-abuses.htnil.
41. Babi , 358 N.L.R.B. No. 148, at 23-24.
42. Grand Sichuan, 2013 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *5-7, *32-33 (Nov. 6, 2013), adopted by Grand
Sichuan, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 161 (Feb. 27, 2014) (cease and desist order).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this [Act], or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding.... "), see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (clarifying that FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is applicable with
respect to both oral and written complaints).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (establishing an exception for retail industries). For
retail companies, the Board has a minimum requirement of $500,000 annual gross volume of business.
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employers with fifteen or more employees. 5 Even though the lack of a
private right of action can be a limitation in some circumstances, it could be
a benefit in others. In the NLRA context, the Board, when it pursues a case,
will investigate and prosecute the case on the employees' behalf at no
charge. This would alleviate challenges to gaining access to private legal
representation.46
2. Workers Without NLRA Rights
A number of worker centers organize workers who are in occupations
that are explicitly excluded from the NLRA. Indeed, Janice Fine's survey
of worker centers in the United States illustrates that 56 percent of worker
centers primarily organize workers along industry lines (rather than along
geographic or ethnic lines).4 Of that 56 percent, a majority of the workers
fall within one of the NLRA-excluded categories of workers. 8 For worker
centers in these industries, the NLRA has little relevance. Moreover,
worker centers have also organized workers who labor in liminal
occupations that make it difficult to determine whether they are explicitly
excluded from the NLRA.49
When Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, it explicitly excluded
farmworkers and domestic workers from its protections.50 Almost thirty
percent of industry-based worker centers organize these two excluded
For nonretail companies, the Board's minimum requirement is that hey have $50,000 annual outflow or
inflow, direct or indirect. See Michael C. Harper, Samuel Estreicher & Kati L. Griffith, LABOR LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, & PROBLEMS 76 (8 ed., 2015) ("Direct outflow refers to goods shipped or services
furnished directly by the employer to entities out ide the state, and direct inflow to goods or services
furnished directly to the employer from entities outside the state. Indirect outflow includes sales within
the state oentities who subsequently sell the goods or services outside the state. Indirect inflow refers
to the purchase of goods or services which originated outside the employer's state but which it
purchased from a seller within the state."). Even though there may be state law equivalents that do not
have these jurisdictional limitations, it is important to note the NLRA's coverage of smaller employers
as compared to other federal labor and employment statutes.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
46. See Aaron Halegua, Legal Representation for New York City's Chinese Immigrant Workers:
The Role of Intermediate Institutions, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE FOR
AMERICANS OF AVERAGE MEANS (forthcoming) (discussing challenges to access to justice and how
worker centers facilitate access to legal services).
47. FINE, supra note 1, at 23.
48. See id. Twenty-five percent of workers work in the day labor/construction industry, while
another 16 percent work in agriculture, and another 13 percent work as domestic workers. The
remaining workers work for hotels/restaurants/casinos (19 percent), in healthcare (6 percent),
manufacturing (6 percent), poultry (6 percent), workfare/welfare (3 percent), or are temporary workers
(6 percent).
49. For further discussion of inhibitors to worker center use of the NLRA regime, see Julie Yates
Rivchin, Building Power Among Low-Wage Immigrant Workers: Some Legal Considerations for
Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397 (2004).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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categories of workers.5 Thus, groups like the National Domestic Workers
Alliance (NDWA) and its state affiliates simply cannot turn to the NLRB
for relief when one of its domestic worker members is retaliated against for
engaging in organizing activities.5 2  In fact, one aspect of the NDWA's
legislative agenda is to gain similar state-level protections for domestic
workers to engage in collective activity.53
Another deterrent to accessing federal labor protections for worker
centers is that some of them organize workers that fall within the legally
gray area between "employee" and "independent contractor" status under
the NLRA. Through the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1946, Congress
excluded "independent contractors" from the NLRA's protections."
Twenty-five percent of the industry-based worker centers identified in
Fine's study organize day laborer/construction workers. 5 Organizers for
the National Day Labor Organizing Network (NDLON) and its affiliates
cannot assume that day laborers-individuals who generally perform work
for various employers on a day-to-day basis-are protected by the NLRA.
In day-laborer cases, the NLRB is likely to apply a multi-factored, highly
fact-dependent test5 6 to determine whether the particular day laborers that
allege employer retaliation fall within the NLRA's coverage.
This kind of legal uncertainty could slow down the NLRB process
considerably, making the process unattractive to worker centers that want to
find timely recourse for employer retaliation in response to their day-laborer
organizing efforts. The number of low-wage workers that fall within this
legal gray area continues to grow in the United States. Several scholars
have convincingly illustrated that as U.S. companies increasingly
decentralize production and decision-making,57 the use of low-wage
51. FINE, supra note 1, at 23. Sixteen percent work in agriculture, and the remaining 13 percent
work as domestic workers.
52. See Matthew Cunningham-Cook, Domestic Workers Look to Extend Gains, NAT'L DOMESTIC
WORKERS ALLIANCE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.domesticworkers.org/news/2012/domestic-workers-
look-extend-gains (referring to the NLRA and stating that "Southern representatives insisted that two
groups who were then a majority African American be left out: farmworkers and domestic workers.").
53. See Leon Neyfakh, Not Your Grandpa's Labor Union; As 'Employee' and 'Employer'
Become Hazy Categories, Experiments in Worker Advocacy Are Replacing Unions As We've Known
Them, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2014, at Ki, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/
04/05/how-labor-advocacy-changing/QKULXuazXGHMW7EBBe6IKJ/story.html ("[A]s other states
consider adopting similar laws [to NY's Domestic Workers' Bill of Rights], the organization [NDWA]
faces the task of devising a system that would allow its members to make collective demands of their
employers, even though they all work for different people.").
54. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
55. FINE, supra note 1, at 23.
56. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, at 1 (Sept. 30, 2014).
57. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for
Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251,
253 (2006) ("Vertical disintegration and production decentralization have enabled firms in both the
WORKER CENTERS AND LABOR LA WPROTECTIONS
"dependent independent-contractors" has also increased. 8  In cases
involving only one employer that is a small fly-by-night business59 worker
centers may be dissuaded from pursuing an NLRB strategy because it may
be more difficult to collect through a drawn-out legal process. In sum, this
problem of legal uncertainty threatens to challenge worker centers for years
to come.
The electronically-available NLRB cases involving worker centers
involved employees who were clearly included in the statutory definition of
"employee," including meat and poultry processing workers, food
preparers, restaurant workers, nail salon lacquerers, and furniture
assemblers. These exceptions notwithstanding, worker centers often
organize categories of workers that are either explicitly excluded from the
NLRA's protections or excluded in practice due to their proper
classification or misclassification as "independent contractors." The
NLRA's definition of independent contractor is broader than the FLSA'sj0
which may dissuade worker centers from using the NLRA even when they
pursue other legal claims through FLSA and state wage and hour
protections.
3. Workers Without Access to NLRA Remedies
The NLRA also has reduced relevance for worker centers that organize
unauthorized immigrant workers. Even though unauthorized immigrant
employees have NLRA rights, they do not have access to the NLRA's
backpay and reinstatement remedies. 6' A central feature of the vast
majority of worker centers is that they organize low-wage immigrants
regardless of immigration status.62 When worker centers are organizing
unauthorized immigrant workers, and those workers are fired in retaliation
manufacturing and service sectors to make their operations leaner, more flexible, less top-heavy, and
better adapted to global competition.").
58. Professor Katherine Stone refers to these workers as "dependent independent contractors"
because they are low-wage workers, often highly dependent on a contractor, but they sometimes have
been given some discretion over the work they perform. Id. at 281-82. David Weil's recent book, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 28, illustrates the growth of the use of independent contractors and
independent contractor misclassification.
59. See Halegua, supra note 46 ("Countless small, family-owned businesses have managed to
avoid paying court judgments by engaging in a variety of tactics, including declaring bankruptcy,
transferring ownership of the business, or closing the business (and sometimes reopening it under a
different name and with different nominal owners). Although employers are personally liable under
federal and state labor laws, an employer seeking to evade hability may file for personal bankruptcy or
find other ways to shelter his or her assets.").
60. Compare Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003), with CNN Am., Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. No. 47 (Sept. 15, 2014).
61. For more thorough treatment of the NLRA and unauthorized imnmgrants, see Michael C.
Harper et al., supra note 44, "Chapter 14: Labor Law and Immigration," in LABOR LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, & PROBLEMS (8th ed. 2015).
62. See FINE, supra note 1, at 18, 29-30.
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for engaging in protected concerted activities in the workplace, some
worker centers may view the NLRB process as having little to offer.
The NLRA's reinstatement remedy is not available to unauthorized
immigrant employees because federal immigration law prohibits employers
from knowingly employing an employee who lacks immigration status.63
Moreover, a 2002 Supreme Court case limited unauthorized employees'
access to the NLRA's backpay remedy. In this 2002 case, Hoffman Plastic
Compounds v. NLRB, the Supreme Court concluded that an unauthorized
employee who had violated the Immigration Reform and Control Act, and
who had been illegally fired by his employer due to union organizing
activity, did not have access to the NLRA's backpay and reinstatement
remedies.64
Although the NLRB may determine that there was a violation of the
NLRA in cases involving concerted activity among unauthorized workers,65
the remedies available do not provide relief directly to the individual
worker. A notice-posting and cease and desist order are likely to be the
only remedies available at the end of the Board's sometimes lengthy
process. 66 Thus, for worker centers that organize immigrant workers
regardless of immigration status, the NLRB process holds little promise to
protect employees who engage in concerted activity from employer
retaliation.
There are a few exceptions, however, that are worth noting. In the
majority of electronically available NLRB cases involving worker centers,
immigration status was not reported as an issue in the proceedings.
Nonetheless, in one of the cases, the NLRB mentioned the immigration
status of employees because a question was raised about the availability of
backpay. 67 These allegedly unauthorized employees found it worthwhile to
pursue an NLRB strategy, despite questions that were raised about their
immigration status.
While immigration status is relevant to the NLRB's backpay and
reinstatement remedies, the Board has committed to keep immigration
status out of the merits stage of an unfair labor practice case.69 In Flaum
Appetizing Corp., the Board clarified that when employers raise an
immigration status affirmative defense to certain remedies it has the burden
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2012).
64. 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002).
65. See Tuv Taam Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 756, 759-60 (2003) (clarifying that inmigration status is
not relevant during the liability stage of the case).
66. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds 535 U.S. at 152.
67. Majestic Rest. & Buffet, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 277, at *42-64 (Sept. 4, 2009).
68. See id at *264-66.
69. See Tuv Taam Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. at 759-60..
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to plead specific facts about immigration status and is foreclosed from
engaging in an immigration status "fishing expedition."70
Further, it is possible that in the future the NLRB will fashion new
types of remedies in cases involving unauthorized employees. In the
Board's 2011 Mezonos Maven Bakery case, for instance, two concurring
Board Members stated:
It is arguable, for example, that a remedy that requires payment by the
employer of backpay equivalent to what it would have owed to an
undocumented discriminatee would not only be consistent with Hoffman,
but would advance Federal labor and immigration policy objectives. Such
backpay could be paid, for example, into a fund to make whole
discriminatees whose backpay the Board had been unable to collectFalse
[W]e would be willing to consider in a future case any remedy within our
statutory powers that would prevent an employer that discriminates against
undocumented workers because of their protected activity from being
unjustly enriched by its unlawful conduct.7'
On February 27, 2015 a General Counsel memorandum signaled the
Board's willingness to consider additional remedies such as reimbursement
of organizing and bargaining expenses and consequential damages, in cases
involving NLRA violations against unauthorized employees.
Moreover, in some exceptional cases, the NLRB will assist
unauthorized workers by certifying them for a U visa due to their assistance
in enforcing a serious labor violation. This U visa certification, if
ultimately approved by federal immigration authorities, can help
unauthorized workers gain immigration status. 73  For example, a 2011
NLRB Associate Counsel Memorandum stated that these visas are
sometimes available when employers engage in "egregious conduct" like
"interfering with protected activity through illegal threats of retaliation such
as threats to call immigration authorities. '7 At least one worker center has
70. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 5 (Dec. 30, 2011), see also Memorandum OM 12-55 from Anne
Purcell, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to All Reg'l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 3 (May 4,
2012), available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458099b423 ("[R]egions may
consider whether a charged party commits an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) where, without
evidence of an employee's disabling status, it issues Board subpoenas for the employee's work
authorization documents for purposes of harassing the employee").
71. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 47, at 9 (Aug. 9, 2011) (Members Liebman and Pearce, concurring), see
also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941) (stating that he Board "does not exist for
the adjudication of private rights, it acts in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy
of the Act") (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Memorandum GC-15-03 from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel to All Reg'l Dirs.,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2015), available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/
document.aspx/0903 ld4581bld428.
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p) (2012).
74. Memorandum OM 11-62 from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to All Reg'l Dirs.,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 4 (June 7, 2011), available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link!
document.aspx/0903 ld45818801f9.
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facilitated NLRB approval for U visas on behalf of unauthorized workers
who faced NLRA violations.75
Despite these potential exceptions, for the vast majority of worker
centers that organize and advocate for workers regardless of immigration
status, the fear that immigration status might become an issue during NLRB
proceedings is a formidable deterrent to using the NLRB legal process to
seek relief from employer retaliation.
B. Lack of Knowledge and Organizational Resources
For a variety of reasons related to their organizational and funding
structures, worker centers who organize workers and pursue legal strategies
may be unfamiliar with, or fear, turning to the NLRB for relief. Worker
centers rarely have lawyers on staff or on retainer.76 Worker centers' lack
of stable legal assistance flows from the fact that their organizational and
funding structures are often fluid and somewhat unpredictable from year to
year.77 Worker centers tend to be nonprofit organizations that vary greatly
in size.78 On the whole, however, worker centers generally have relatively
small budgets and few paid staff.
Funding for worker centers is not comprehensively documented to
date. The information available, however, reveals that worker centers tend
to have diverse and unstable funding sources, including grants from
foundations, charitable donations from individuals, and grants from
government agencies to allow worker centers to assist in enforcing
employment laws." For those few worker centers that have members and
75. Eg., Trabajadores Indocumentados Pudieran Recibir U-Visa Por Ser Maltratados, NAT'L
DAY LAB. ORG. NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.org/en/news-all/1 16-nigrant-ights-news/2005-
trabajadores-indocumentados-pudieran-recibir-u-visa-por-ser-maltratados (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
76. See Gown J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation as Progressive Lawyering? Moving
Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 76 (2013) (referring to
the Urban Justice Center and stating that "lawyers represent members from a number of worker centers
using a 'resource ally' model of lawyering in which lawyers support community organizing through
legal representation of members of external grassroots organizations") (internal quotation marks
omitted), Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, at 248-49 (noting that Young Workers United "does not
have any attorneys on its staff').
77. See Fine, A Marriage Made in Heaven?, supra note 11, at 341.
78. See FINE, supra note 1, at 217-18, N. AM. ALLIANCE FAIR EMP., STRATEGY SERIES, WORKER
CENTER STRATEGIES, WORKING PAPER ONE 20 (2002) available at http://www.fairjobs.org/archive/
sites/default/files/WP1.pdf
79. See FINE, supra note 1, at 214, 217-18.
80. See Chesa Boudin & Rebecca Scholtz, Strategic Options fur Development of a Worker
Center, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 91, 98 n.35, 103, 109 (2010), Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Entering
a New Stage of Growth and Development, 20 NEW LAB. F. 44, 46 (2011), Janice Fine et al., Building a
Future Together: Worker Centers and Construction Unions, 33 LAB. STUD. J. 27 (2008), see also
Capital Campaign, CASA LATINA, http://casa-latina.org/capital-campaign (last visited Apr. 5, 2015),
Donate, MALIBU LAB. EXCHANGE, http://www.mahbucomnnunitylaborexchange.org/#!donate/cu9p (last
visited Apr. 5, 2015), Funding, VOZ WORKERS RTS. EDUC. PROJECT, http://portlandvoz.org/what-is-
voz/funding/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). The Department of Labor has the yearly Susan Harwood Grants
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require dues from them, dues money tends to constitute a small minority of
overall funding.8' Despite the diversity of worker centers' funding sources,
many reports suggest that grants and donations from charitable foundations
represent a key stream of funding for worker centers. 8 2
These meager and fluctuating budgets limit worker centers' abilities to
hire specialized legal staff or to spend valuable staff time learning and
strategizing about the variety of legal options available to support their
worker organizing efforts. Thus, some worker centers may not turn to the
NLRB because they simply do not know enough about what this legal route
has to offer or how to navigate it effectively. Indeed, one scholar has
referred to the NLRA's protection of non-union concerted activity among
employees as "one of the best-kept secrets of labor law."83
Another disincentive for worker centers' proactive use of federal labor
protections is that they may fear, either explicitly or implicitly, that doing
so would threaten their current organizational strategies and structures in
important ways. Attempting to access NLRA remedies may result in
employers bringing NLRB section 8(b) counterclaims against them for
engaging in picketing or boycotting activity. In addition, proactively using
the NLRB process could mean that worker centers would be subject to
additional reporting requirements to the U.S. Department of Labor and
could mean that they would need to follow specified election procedures to
select the organization's leaders that do not fit with their organizational
culture. Worker centers often view themselves as social movements, rather
than as organizations that Congress intended to regulate due to the
industrial strife and high profile union corruption cases of the past.8
to build capacity among community groups to help inform workers about their ights under OSHA,
many of these grants go to worker centers. Susan Hardwood Training Grant Program Award
Announcements, U.S. DEP'T. LAB, https://www.osha.gov/dte/sharwood/grant awards.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2015).
81. There is disagreement among worker centers about collecting dues. Since many members are
low-wage workers, some centers do not want to add to these workers' financial burden. On the other
hand, one leader from the Restaurant Opportunities Center United suggested it was paternalistic to
assume low-wage workers could not afford dues. Josh Eidelson, Who Should Fund Alt-Labor?, THE
NATION (July 17, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175313/who-should-fund-alt-labor#.
82. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2014, at Bi, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/business/as-worker-advocacy-
groups-gain-momentum-businesses-fight-back.htnil (stating that according to U.S. Commerce report,
"millions of dollars have flowed to worker centers from [twenty-one] foundations").
83. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old
is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002). The phrase was later quoted in Wilma
B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations
Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 583 (2007).
84. These two amendments to the NLRA have separate definitions of "labor organization." An
organization's status as a labor organization under one is not determinative of its status as a labor
organization under the other. See Naduis-Weissman, supra note 6, at 335.
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From a doctrinal perspective, a worker center's use of the NLRA's
section 7 protection should not have a direct effect on whether they are
"labor organizations" under the Taft Hartley and Landrum Griffin
Amendments.85 As mentioned above, the NLRA's section 7 protections are
given to employees regardless of their connection to a "labor organization"
as defined by the Act. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the
applicability of the NLRA's restrictive aspects could be a formidable
disincentive for some worker centers.
Given the wide variety of worker centers, the labor organization debate
is likely to continue to unfold on a case-by-case basis. It is beyond the
scope of this essay to elaborate the intricacies of the entire debate here, but
the existing literature on the issue illustrates that this is an unsettled area of
law. Scholars have marshaled arguments for and against labor organization
status for worker centers.8 6  The NLRB General Counsel, in a case
involving the Restaurant Opportunities Center, concluded that it was not a
"labor organization," but based its conclusions on the nature of the lawsuit
settlement and other specific facts of the case.87 Even those who have
extensively argued that worker centers are not NLRA labor organizations
have suggested that the more they access the NLRB's remedies, the more
the agency might start to see them as "labor organizations" that are engaged
in the kinds of industrial strife intended to be regulated by the Act.88 This
would change the kinds of strategies worker centers could pursue and
change the relationship they have to their constituencies. There are no
indications that the NLRB is likely to do this in the future, but the concern
is understandable.
CONCLUSION
By illustrating why the NLRA has largely lacked relevance for this
new breed of worker organization to date, this essay raises a broader
question about the NLRA's relevance to workplace disputes in the United
States' post-industrial economy. Utilizing the framework developed here,
further empirical work through surveys and in-depth interviews could help
to further specify why worker centers have not turned to the NLRB more
proactively to support their organizing efforts.
This essay points to some central inquiries that could illuminate why
the NLRB is underutilized by worker centers. Is it a lack of knowledge
about NLRA protections, which the Board could help overcome with more
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., id, Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 513, Hyde, supra note 6.
87. See Rest. Opportunities Ctr. of NY, 2006 NLRB GCM LEXIS 52 (Nov. 30, 2006).
88. See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 6, at 335 ("Reaping the benefits of labor law protections
without suffering the negative consequences may strike some as an unfair or 'strategic' use of the law,
and a sense of equity may influence adjudicators to avoid this result.").
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outreach? Is it the worker center's inexperience with NLRB processes,
which could be solved by greater involvement by worker centers in the
process of filing and pursuing charges on behalf of their constituents? Is it
resistance to the NLRB process because of immigration status concerns, the
sometimes elusive independent contractor exemptions or a concern that
utilizing the NLRB's protections would ultimately lead to subjecting
worker centers to the NLRB's restrictions on labor organizations? Do
worker centers know about the NLRB, but simply prefer the retaliation
protections of other statutory regimes?
Answers to these questions will help identify how to address, if at all,
worker centers' underutilization of the Board's process.89 The NLRA 's 8 0 th
anniversary this year serves as an opportunity to consider how to enhance
the Board's ability to fulfill its statutory purpose to protect collective
activity among employees, especially those marginal workers currently
served by worker centers. Doing so will ensure that the Act will remain
salient in the modern era, rather than simply becoming a New Deal
"relic".90
89. Professor Michael Duff has argued that a narrowing of the labor organization definition may
satisfy advocates of worker centers, as well as employer advocates, who want to create more room for
employee-management work teams and committees. See Duff, supra note 6, at 843, 875-76.
90. See Wilma B. Liebman, The Revival ofAmerican Labor Law, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 291,
301, 308 (2010) (noting that "American labor law is derided by some as a relic of the Depression and
New Deal era" but that she is "cautiously hopeful about the revitalization of labor law").
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